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Abstract 
Committee Decision Making in Monetary Policy 
by 
Hyungju Cha 
Advisor: Professor Merih Uctum 
One reason of the criticism about Taylor rule would be that the rule could not provide a micro foundation 
about the decision-making mechanism. because it is simply describing the policy process in terms of the 
short-term nominal interest rate. In order to reconcile the tension between critics and supporters of Taylor 
rule, chapter I employs the theory of team, which investigates how members in a team interact to 
determine optimal decisions. Using team theory, it is shown how optimal monetary policy is results from 
committee members' interactions. 
 
In chapter II, if the government cannot recognizes that the monetary policy can affect the economy with a 
lag or if observed data for decision-making is real-time data, following Orphanides (2001, 2003), this 
policy is not effective as much as their expectation. From Friedman's metaphor of "Fool in the shower", it 
is reasonable to include time lags in committee decision-making. In chapter II, including lags in the 
information structure, recognition and administrative lags, optimal inertial monetary policy is derived. 
 
In chapter III, FIML and SUR are employed to check if the actual data support the optimal monetary 
policy obtained under committee decision-making. The empirical evidence supports the inclusion of the 
lagged interest rate and the persistent shock in errors. 
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Chapter 1
Committee Decision Making in
Monetary Policy
1.1 Introduction
After Taylor (1993) suggested a simple framework describing the evolution of monetary policy in
the U.S., this has had considerable influence on monetary economics. This is not only because
Taylor was successful in explaining the monetary policy within Paul Volcker and Alan Greenspan
era but also because this simple rule can describe policy process in terms of the short-term nominal
interest rate. Even with the success in explaining the Federal Funds rate within Paul Volcker
and Alan Greenspan era, there are two main shortcoming in Taylor-type rule. One is theoretical
problem, and the other is empirical one.
From theoretical point of view, Taylor rule is simply describing the decision-making process only
in terms of short-term nominal interest rates. However, it is too simple to capture the property
of the actual decision-making process. Of course, this can be effective framework. This is because
Taylor rule can be derived from minimizing the social welfare loss in which it has some components
1
2such as output gap and inflation gap. Due to this reason, Taylor rule can be seen as having
micro-foundation. As known, the social planner problem is based on Tinbergen’s principal idea.
(See Tibergen (1952)), that is, the government’s objective or welfare function could be written as
endogenous variable like inflation, unemployment, or output gap if every economic system is com-
plete. Therefore, this approach is very simple and attractive. But, as pointed out by Theil (1956),
this approach has some problems. One of them is this approach assumes that policy-makers’ utility
is satisfied by corresponding to target variables. The problem implies that this policy function is
ad-hoc. In contrast with this, Woodford (2003) suggest micro-founded loss function or utility-based
loss function which includes second-order approximation of agent’s utility maximization. However,
since this approach is still minimizing the social welfare loss, it is still subject to Theil’s criticism
(Theil 1956)
Cochrane (2011) argues that without assuming the orthogonality between policy instrument vari-
ables and the disturbance, it could not be available to measure the policy response, for instance,
coefficients on output gap and inflation gap. Since output and inflation could be related to each
other through the Phillips curve, both variables are affected by same disturbance. Therefore,
the correlation of instruments in Taylor rule with errors could not be removed. This is known
as identification problem. Therefore, price determinancy is not available due to identification
problem, that is, there are multiple equilibria. This is because the condition for a unique stationary
equilibrium depends on coefficients in Taylor rule. If policy disturbance is forecasting error,
however, determinancy and identification could be possible since policy instruments are orthogonal
to forecasting error. The problem in here is how policy disturbance could be forecasting error.1
According to Rudebusch (2006), moreover, Taylor rule provides incomplete description of monetary
policy. It provides a basic narrative history of how the Federal Reserve responses to macroeconomic
1In addition to this, Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2001) pointed out that Taylor rule leads to global
indeterminacy even though equilibrium is locally unique.
3development factors such as financial market factors in addition to current output gap and inflation.
(These macroeconomic developments appear in figure 1.1.) In figure 1.1, without including financial
frictions in Taylor rule, both inertial Taylor rule and non-inertial one are deviated from actual
Federal Funds rate when there are some financial frictions. Therefore, only output gap and inflation
in the rule is not enough to describe the movement of Federal Funds rate and it is needed to include
macroeconomic development in the rule without amending the Fed’s objective function. In this
vein, it would be reasonable to include additional or different variables in Taylor rule.2
In empirical point of view, Orphanides (2001) argues that simple policy rule is based on the timeli-
ness of data availability and ignore the difference between initial data and subsequent data revision.
In addition, Orphanides (2003) also argue that noisy information regarding the measurement of
economic activity for the evaluation of monetary policy can not account for the actual economic
activity for the evaluation. Therefore, although the rule may appear to capture the movement in
actual data, it can not provide actual economic situation if the revised data are employed. In this
vein, the success of Taylor rule to explain the movement in Federal Funds rate would be due to
employing the revised data. Sometimes, it would not be successful as much as described in Taylor
(1993)
In sum, one reason for the criticism would be the rule could not provide enough micro-foundation
about decision-making mechanism so that it would not be reasonable that a single policymaker
makes the decision only based on output and inflation gap, ignoring the data availability and
monetary policy committee decision-making mechanism.3 In other words, Taylor rule cannot
explain which indicator they pay attention when there is economic crisis and how each indicator
2For example, Ang and Piazzesi (2003) employed real activity and inflation factor data using factor analysis instead
of inflation and GDP data, typically used in empirical analysis in Taylor rule.
3Of course, the single agent problem, minimizing the welfare loss function, could be enough micro-foundation. But,
it is too simple to capture the dynamic decision-making process in monetary policy committee
4can have forecasting error.4 In order to decrease the tension between Taylor rule and its criticism,
this chapter employs the theory of team, which investigates how members in team interact to
determine optimal decision. Using team theory, this chapter shows that how optimal monetary
policy is resulted from committee members’ interaction, how policy disturbance can be seen as
forecasting error, and how timeliness of data availability can be incorporated into decision-making
process.
Figure 1.1: Deviations of actual funds rate from estimated value from Taylor rule (Rudebusch 2006)
1.2 Decision Making in the Committee
”My experience as a member of the FOMC left me with a strong feeling that the theoretical fiction
that monetary policy is made by a single individual maximizing a well-defined preference function
4Brookings project(1993) about policy regimes examined the many types of short-term interest rate using model
such as GEM, INTERMOD, LIVERPOOL, MPS, MSG, MULTIMOD, MX3, and Taylor, and showed that economic
performance was better when target variable was nominal income targeting or real output and inflation targeting.
Put simply, Taylor rule is on the basis of real output and inflation targeting. See Bryant, Hooper and Mann (1993)
5misses something important. In my view, monetary theorists should start paying some attention
to the nature of decision-making by committee, which is rarely mentioned in the academic litera-
ture.”(Blinder 1998, pp.22)
Even though size of the monetary policy committee, and decision making process (for exam-
ple, simple majority voting, or consensus) are different to each central bank in each country, one
important common factor in decision-making in central banks is the policy results from committee
member interaction.5 The questions arise here are why committee decision-making is needed in con-
trast with the typical assumption, single agent decision-making, how committee makes the decision
and what effect it has on. First, according to literatures, theoretically, monetary policy conducted
by the committee is better than one by individual decision making in terms of the accuracy since
the committee can have more information than single agent. (Gerlach-Kristen 2006) Meanwhile,
empirically, group decision-making performs better than individual decision-making even though
the speed of group decision-making is slower. (This is because the speed can decrease the accuracy
due to the lag response.) (Blinder and Morgan 2006) In this vein, committee decision-making in
monetary policy is the natural result.
Second one, most of the literature focuses on voting behavior and how voting rule affects on its
final-decision. However, these do not focus on its general effect on the economy. In this point
of view, needless to say, the study about committee decision-making is very important to study
how they decide the optimal policy and how its mechanism affects on the economy.6 But, the
complexity arises when there is the conflict of interest in committee decision making. In other
words, if each member has the different objective in decision-making or perception in economic
5Differences among the central banks is well described in Fujiki (2005)
6In this vein, Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2006) showed that the committee in the central bank has the effect on
financial market and this effect depends on how the committee organizes or who is most effective person through
publishing booklet like economic outlook or press. However, this paper did not show direct effect of decision-making
in the committee.
6situation, they will do strategic voting behavior. Due to their strategic voting behavior, that is,
they act individualistically, it is not easy to find out the closed-form of monetary policy rule. This
is because the derived optimal policy is the outcome of game-theoretic results in this case, and this
can be changed by the preference determined by which situation they face or which payoff they can
receive when the decision is made.7
According to Meade and Sheets (2005), Fed committee members focus on their regional situation
more than national wide issues. This empirical result implies that there are some conflict of
interest in FOMC. But, according to Yellen (2005), the former president and chief executive
officer of Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, ”In fact, I think FOMC members behave far less
individualistically and strategically than assumed in some of the model.....”(pp.2) In both points of
view, it would be possible to conclude that the difference among members is not due to its conflict
of interest but their different observation about economic situation or different perception. In other
words, because they could perceive the situation differently due to regional difference, their voting
behavior seem to be individualistic or strategic.8
If, however, it is assumed that each member has the same objective, for example, price stabilization
or minimizing output gap with different perceptions about economy, committee decision-making
can be seen as a team decision-making. In this case, decision-making in the committee would be
relatively simpler than game-theoretic situation in committee decision-making.
1.2.1 The theory of Team
In economics, typically individual agent decides own optimal decision to maximize or minimize
their objectives. In line with this, the main property of the team is that there is single objective
7The literatures related to this is well summarized in Gerling and Schulte (2005)
8the perception problem between agents in decision-making is similar to the situation in Geanakoplos and Pole-
marchakis (1982). In this situation, two agents have different perception about the event and they disagree with each
other. But, updating information based on Bayesian way, they converge to one to find out true situation.
7or payoff to all members so that they have the same objective or payoff. In terms of this, we can
classify organizations based on following propositions and find out general proposition of team.9(S
will denote the set of all states)
a. For every i(i = 1, . . . , n), there exists a complete ordering Gi on S [That is, every group member
has a preference ordering]: Rationality of members.
b. There exists a transitive ordering G0 on S [That is, the states can be ordered for the group at
least partially]: Transitivity of group interests.
c. For any s, s′ if sGis′ for all i = 1, . . . , n then sG0s′. [That is, if s is not worse than s’ it is not
worse than s’ for the group itself.]: The so-called Pareto Optimality principle.
d. For any s, s′ in S, sG0s′ or s′G0s. [That is, for no pair of states is it impossible to say which
is preferable for the group, unless the two are equally desirable]: Completeness of group
preferences. (Note that B and D imply together complete ordering.)
e. For all i = 1, . . . , n, sGis
′ if and only if sG0s′. [That is, all individuals have identical interest
among themselves and with the group]: Solidarity.
From above propositions, (1) if a is satisfied we call n group members rational, (2) if a, b, and c
are satisfied, the group is coalition, (3) if a, b, c and d are satisfied we call it a foundation, (4) if
a, b, c, d and e are satisfied we call it a team. 1011 Therefore team can be defined as organization
in which each member controls different action and different information but have same objectives,
that is, there is a single goal or payoff to all members in the team.
9For details about the team theory, see Marschak (1955) and McGuire and Radner (1972). For its application, see
Beckmann (1958) and McGuire (1961)
10These propositions are quoted from Marschak (1960)
11In case of coalition or foundation, its final-decision depends on game-theoretic outcome. Therefore, in order to
understand its outcome, we need to investigate which solution concept is applied to get final-decision, for example,
Hurwicz solution(Hurwicz 1951) or Minimax solution. As mentioned above, because the payoff of each member in
game situation depends on their own situation, in other words, because it is changed as time passed by due to the
difference in their objective, this leads individualistic behavior and general solution for decision making in organization
is not easy.
8Typically, team-theoretic decision problem has 5 ingredients, random variable, observation, decision
variable, strategy (decision rule), and loss criteria.12
a. States of Nature: ξ = [ξ1, · · · , ξm]. They may be measurement noise, random disturbance,
uncertain initial conditions, etc.
b. A set of Observations: z = [z1, · · · , zn] which are given functions of ξ, i.e., zi =
ηi(ξ1, · · · , ξm), i = 1, · · · , n. In general, zi is known as the information or observation
available to the ith decision maker. The set {ηi|i = 1, · · · , n} is denoted as the information
structure of the problem.
c. A set of decision variables: u ≡ [u1, · · · , un]
d. The strategy (decision rule, control law) of the ith decision maker is a map γi : Zi → Ui, ui =
γi(zi)
e. The loss (payoff) criterion of the problem is a map L: Ξ × U → R, i.e., Loss =
L(u1, · · · , un, ξ1, · · · , ξm)
From these, the team decision can be defined as follows; Find γi ∈ Γi, ∀i in order to minimize J =
Eξ[L(u = γ(η(ξ)), ξ)] or Minγ∈ΓJ(γ). Generally, in team theory, typical payoff function is assumed
as a quadratic cost function. This is because its optimal decision for a quadratic function is
sometimes linear and easy to handle.13. Due to this reason, common goal for team in this also
uses a quadratic cost function.
J(γ1, · · · , γN ) = E[J] = E[1
2
uTQu+ uTSξ + uTc] (1.1)
12These are quoted from Ho (1980)
13See Radner (1962)
9Where u = [u1, · · · , uN ]′, Q is symmetric positive definite, ui are given by above, and the expectation
is taken with respect to a priori ξ. Given the quadratic cost function, optimal decision is not partial
derivatives with respect to control variable, ui. As mentioned above, because optimal decision for
team is the result of interaction, optimal decision has to incorporate individual optimal decision
into its final decision f. Therefore, to find out optimal team decision, we need the additional criteria
as follows14:
J(γ∗1 , · · · , γ∗i−1, γi, γ∗i+1, · · · , γ∗N ) 6 J(γ∗1 , · · · , γ∗i−1, γ∗i , γ∗i+1, · · · , γ∗N ) (1.2)
For all γi ∈ Γ and for all i
Simply this inequality implies optimal team decision has to be optimal to all members in the team.
But the problem is that each individual optimal could not be team optimal. In other words, because
this inequality includes non-cooperative individual decision in team, this condition could not be team
optimality. In this vein, this is necessary for global optimal but not sufficient condition. Therefore
we call this member-by-member optimal.
For this reason, we rewrite (1.1) as
J = E{J[γ∗1(z1), · · · , γ∗i−1(zi−1), γi(zi), γ∗i+1(zi+1), · · · , γ∗N (ZN ), ξ]} (1.3)
= Ezi{E[J|zi]} for fixed γ∗1 , · · · , γ∗i−1, γi, γ∗i+1, · · · , γ∗N
Where second is conditional expectation given any values of zi. This implies that optimal team
decision is one in which team optimal decision is made based on other members’ previous decisions
so that the team problem is to find out the optimal decision given fixed other members’ deci-
14The necessary condition for optimality is well described in Ho and Chu (1972)
10
sions (control law), γ∗1 , · · · , γ∗i−1, γ∗i+1, · · · , γ∗N .15 Therefore we can rewrite common goal for team as
follows:
minuiE[
1
2
uTQu+ uTSξ + uTc|zi] , minuiJi (1.4)
where uT = [γ∗T1 (z1), · · · , γ∗Ti−1(zi−1), γTi (zi), γ∗Ti+1(zi+1), · · · , γ∗TN (zN )] for fixed γ∗j (zj), j 6=
i, and any zi In this case, a necessary condition for the optimality of team could be obtained
by partial derivatives of Ji with resepect to ui But, this derivative must be considered with commu-
nication pattern. This is because previous decisions uj are included in ui through communication.
16
Finally, communication patterns are very important to get the optimality of team.
1.2.2 Communication Pattern in a Team
One of most important factor in decision-making is information. Simply, because information would
describe the situation about economy, it could be coming out from data-generating process. After
observing economic situation through economic indicators, for example, inflation index, GDP, or
quantity of money, decision-maker can get some information describing the situation.1718 In con-
trast with this, one property of information is sharable. That is, by communication, decision makers
can update their information which is based on others’ observations even with some observational
15The main reason why it assumes that other members’ previous decisions are made before final decision is typically
decision making in team is not made simultaneously except decision-making in voting system. In other words, in team,
because enough discussion is made before final decision-making, each member would know others’ decisions. Therefore
it is natural to interpret the team problem as above. However, communication pattern among members is additional
problem in team decision problem.
16Because of interactions via communication, the partial derivative with respect to ui is Qiiγi +
∑
j 6=1QijE(γi |
zi)+SiE(ξ | zi)+ci+∑j}i[uTi Qij ∂∂uiE(γi | zi)+ ∂∂uiE(γTj Sjξ | zi)+ ∂∂uiE(γTj | zi)cj+∑k 6=i ∂∂uiE(γTk Qkjγj | zi)] = 0.
For details, see Ho and Chu (1972)
17In here, the problem how much economic agents pay attentions to get information is arise, that is, rational
inattention problem proposed by Sims (2003). In this paper, rational inattention problem is ignored because it is not
reasonable assumption that central bank do not pay full attention to observe economic situations.
18For example, FOMC is reported Greenbook for monetary policy.
11
error. Therefore, under the team situation in which there are many decision makers, communication
pattern is very important matter to determine how they update the information about economic
situation, and how they make the decision based on updated information through communication.19
Bavelas (1951) showed that efficiency of decision-making is different among communication patterns,
that is, by experimenting some communication patterns, ”same task-forced but different commu-
nication pattern group” has different efficiency due to different updating in information through
communication. Therefore communication patterns in team is very important to the decision-
making.
If it assumes that there is final-decision maker in team and all communication is finally heading
to final-decision maker20, for example, B in figure 1.2, its efficiency of team is depending on how
they communicate, that is, how they are organized to communicate. Needless to say, based on
above assumptions, if there is only one final-decision maker in team and final-decision maker is
placed on left-end, communication pattern will be headed from right-end to left-end, vice versa.
In both case, since individual observation on left-end individual or right-end individual is different
to each other, intuitively its decision has different efficiency. Hence, it concludes that information
structure depends on its communication pattern and communication is important one to determine
its efficiency in decision-making since information is differently updated by communication.
In sum, information structure can be defined as follows, if communication exists in team:
zi = Hiξ +
∑
j
Dijuj , ∀i. (1.5)
19In communication theory, put simply, communication can be measurable by how much information can be con-
tained in communication. In this point of view, Shannon and Weaver (1963) suggested ”Entrophy” to measure the
information in communication. In this paper, it is assume that all information are transferable to the other agent
within team to ignore entropy.
20Of course, as in voting system, all constituent individual of team can be final-decision maker. In this case, instead
of final-decision maker, decision maker on final-stage is proper one to describe the situation.
12
where Hi and Dij are some positive matrices. Typically, it can be interpreted as weighting on their
information and decisions. In above equation, as mentioned above, information structure consists
of one’s own observation and others’ decisions from their own observation. In other words, second
component on RHS is updated information through the communication among team members.
In dynamic team,21situation as described above, for example, information structure in D in figure 1.2
is as follows22:
z1 = H1ξ z2 = H2ξ z3 = H3ξ
z4 =

H1
H2
H3
H4

ξ +

0
0
0
D′41

u1 +

0
0
0
D′42

u2 +

0
0
0
D′43

u3
z5 =

H1
H2
H3
H4
H5

ξ +

0
0
0
0
D′51

u1 +

0
0
0
0
D′52

u2 +

0
0
0
0
D′53

u3 +

0
0
0
0
D′54

u4
From above, it can conclude that z5 or z4 ’s information structure can deduce from communicating
the decision of the precedent. But, the problem to solve optimal decision given information structure
is that the dependence among members due to the communication make the solution non-linear. In
21In team theory, there are two types of team problem. One is a static-team problem, the other one is a dynamic-
team problem. The difference between problems relies on whether there exists communication or not. Simply, in
static-team problem, typical information structure is zi = Hiξ,∀i.
22For more examples, see Ho and Chu (1972)
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other words, because the information structure depends on decisions of his or her precedents, that
is, decisions made in lower rank affects on the dependence through information structure, optimal
decision of some members could not be linear. For instance, if one member has non-linear decision-
making, then technically, final-decision also would not be linear one.23 In this case, it is not easy to
find out unique final optimal decision of team due to its dependence. In this difficulty, Chu (1972)
suggested an alternative method to find out the optimal solution. This is summarized in figure 1.3:
Figure 1.2: An example of communication patterns (Bavelas 1951)
1.2.3 The Optimal Monetary Policy under Team Situations
In the United State, monetary policy is determined by, as known, Federal Reserve System, espe-
cially, the Borad of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and Federal Open Market Committee
(hereafter FOMC). The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System is responsible for the
discount rate and reserve requirement while FOMC is responsible for open market operations. Even
23Witsenhausen (1968) showed that generally optimal decision of members may not be linear in information.
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Figure 1.3: The procedure to find out the optimal solution. (Chu 1972)
with different policy instruments between them, FOMC is the most important policymaking body
of the Federal Reserve System. This is because the FOMC consists of the five member of the Board
of Governor24 and five Reserve Bank Presidents. Therefore, the decision made at the FOMC would
reflect the decision in the Board of Governor.25
In FOMC, decision-making process is as follows:
1. System staff prepares reports on past and prospective.
2. Staff officer gives oral presentation on current and prospective situation in the meeting.
3. After these report, reports and oral presentation, each member in FOMC expresses his o rher
own views on the state of the economy, forecast for the future, and appropriate policy.
24The Board of governors are composed of 7 members appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate
25For details, see Boyer (2005)
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4. And then, each recommends more explicit policy for the coming inter-meeting period.
5. Finally, the committee has to reach a consensus about appropriate policy or course for policy.
In sum, FOMC decision-making could be described by that after each expresses their opinions
about the economy and states own policy recommendation, final decision is made. In order to
resemble the decision-making process in FOMC closely, it is assumed here that there are three
members in the committee under team situation. Two are members in FOMC and one, final
decision-maker, is the president in FOMC. Since final decision is made after stating or expressing
policy recommendation, communication pattern in this situation would be described as in figure 1.4.
This is because other members’ opinions are some kind of others’ decision-making based on their
information. Put simply, this artificial FOMC could be seen as one in which two agents update or
report their information (or decisions based on observation) to their headquarter.
Figure 1.4: The communication pattern in committee decision-making under artificial FOMC.
Therefore, the information structure in this decision-making process is
z1 = H1ξ z2 = H2ξ
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z3 =

H1
H2
H3
 ξ +

0
0
D′31
u1 +

0
0
D′32
u2
1.2.4 Solution Technique
General framework
One of results in a team problem is that a dynamic-team problem can be solved by the solution
of a static-team problem obtained by Radner (1962).26 This result can simplify the problem in a
dynamic-team even with some limitation.
Suppose that a team problem is the problem in static-team. In this case, each member’s information
structure is a linear function of ξ, where ξ is Gaussian probability density function, N(0, X).
zi = Hiξi
where Hi is qi × n with n > qi. This is because there is no communication among members. Given
the common goal for the team,
E[
1
2
uTQu+ uTSξ + uTc|zi]
The optimal solution for this is
Qiiγi +
∑
j 6=1
QijE(γi | zi) + SiE(ξ | zi) + ci = 0
26 This subsection and following subsections are re-summarized from Ho and Chu (1972) and Chu (1972).
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Compared to the dynamic-team, this is more simplified one. If the the control law is ui = γi(zi) =
Aizi + bi,∀i (where Ai and bi are ki × qi matrix and ki vector, respectively), then optimal solution
is as follows:
Qii(Aizi + bi) +
∑
j 6=1
QijE(AjHjξ + bj | zi) + SiE(ξ | zi) + ci = 0
Because zj = Hjξ
Qii(Aizi + bi) + [
∑
j 6=1
QijE(AjHj + bj | zi) + Si]E(ξ | zi) + ci = 0
Since E(ξ | zi) = Cov(ξ,zi)V ar(zi) = XHTi (HiXHTi )−1 · zi, where X is the variance of ξ, the above equation
is rewritten as
(
N∑
j=1
Qijbj + ci) + [QiiAi + (
∑
j 6=1
QijAjHj + Si) ·XHTi (HiXHTi )−1]zi = 0,∀zi and ∀i
Since the control law is ui = γi(zi) = Aizi + bi, (b
T
1 , b
T
2 , · · · , bTN ) = cTQ−1 from first component in
above equation is obtained, and
QiiAi +
∑
j 6=1
QijAjHj ·XHTi (HiXHTi )−1 = −Si ·XHTi (HiXHTi )−1
or
∑
j 6=1
QijAjHjXH
T
i = −SiXHTi
Therefore, it can conclude that ui = AiZi + bi is optimal for the static-team problem. From
this result, Radner (1962)’s theorem is obtained, that is, in static-team problem, the control law,
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ui = Aizi + bi, is optimal. This implies that the static-team problem with a quadratic objective
function has linear law of control.
Even though the solution in static-team problem is tractable one, this cannot be applied to the
problem in a dynamic-team. As mentioned above, the optimal soultion in dynamic-team may not
be linear due to the communication. Due to this reason, Ho and Chu (1972) proposed the special
information structure, ”Partially nested information structure.” The paritally nested information
structure is one in which each decision-maker in a team can always deduce the action of information
of its precedents since all decisions and information are updated to the followers. Under partially
nested information structure, the control law and information of all precedents is fixed. For example,
as shown above, the information structure for the final decision maker in artificial FOMC is
z3 =

H1
H2
H3
 ξ +

0
0
D′31
u1 +

0
0
D′32
u2
Since all decisions and information is updated to the final decision maker,
∑
Dijuj is redundant
one. In other words, because the decision of precedents is deduced from the information given to
the previous decision-maker,
∑
Dijuj can be deleted from z3. (where j is a precedent.) Let z˜3 be
the partially nested information structure. Then, z3 can be modified as follows:
z˜3 =

H1
H2
H3
 ξ
As seen above, this is exactly same information structure in static-team. Based on this, following
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theorem is obtained:
Theorem 1 (Ho and Chu 1972, pp.20) In a dynamic team with partially nested information structure,
zi = Hiξ +
∑
j Dijuj , is equivalent to an information structure in static form for any fixed set of
control laws, z˜i = [{Hiξ|j{i or j = i}]. This theorem implies that zi = z˜i = Hiξ. Finally, it can be
conclude that in a dynamic-team with partially nested information structure, the optimal control
for each member exist, is unique and linear in zi
27
Under the dynamic-team problem with partially nested information structure is simplified into the
static-team problem. However, since partially nested information structure is one special case in
a team problem, it would not be general to apply this information structure to general dynamic-
team problem. This is because the information structure in a dynamic-team is not always partially
nested. As mentioned above, moreover, since Witsenhausen (1968) argued that generally optimal
action of each member in a team might not be linear in information, more general approach is
needed to solve the dynamic-team problem.
Equivalent controls and construction of a team problem with partially nested informa-
tion (the auxiliary problem)
Due to the problem mentioned above, Chu (1972) suggested the alternative way to solve a dynamic-
team problem with non-nested information structure. To solve general dynamic-team problem,
Chu (1972) invented two concepts, equivalent control and construction of the auxiliary problem.
Intuitively, this is the indirect solution concept for a dynamic-team.
Suppose that a dynamic-team problem with non-nested information structure and one with partially
nested information structure have the optimal law of control. (Let Ω and Ω˜ denote a dynamic-team
problem with non-nested information structure and one with partially nested information structure,
respectively.) Regardless of which team problem is chosen , the optimal law of controls is ui =
27Theorem 2 (Ho and Chu 1972, pp.20)
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γi(zi).( Let ui and u˜i denote the optimal law of control in Ω and Ω˜, respectively.) The information
structure in Ω is zi = ηi(ξ, ui−1) Likewise, the information structure in Ω˜ is zi = ηi(ξ, u˜i−1).
Since the information function, zi (or z˜i) is mapping from the information set, Ξ, and the set of
the law of control, Ui−1 (or U˜i−1) to the information set, Zi (or Z˜i) and the control function, γi
(or γ˜i), is mapping from Zi (or Z˜i) to Ui (or U˜i), ui is the composite function for γiηi such that
ui = γi[ηi(ξ, ui−1)] = γiηi(ξ, ui−1) (Likewise, u˜i = γ˜i[η˜i(ξ, u˜i−1)] = γ˜iη˜i(ξ, u˜i−1).) Therefore, the
composite functions, pi(ξ) (or p˜i(ξ)) can be defined as one mapping from Ξ to Ui (or U˜i). This can
be described in figure 1.5.
Figure 1.5: Equivalent Controls (Chu 1972)
After constructing the composite function, pi and p˜i, it can be conclude that pi = p˜i if and only if
(η1, · · · , ηN ; γ1, · · · , γN ) and (η˜1, · · · , η˜N ; γ˜1, · · · , γ˜N ), the control law (γ1, · · · , γN ) and (γ˜1, · · · , γ˜N )
are equivalent. Therefore, if pi(ξ) = p˜i(ξ), then J = E[J(ξ, UN )] = E[J(ξ, pN (ξ))] =
E[J(ξ, p˜N (ξ))] = E[J(ξ, U˜N )] = J˜ (In here, J is the objective function in a team problem,
therefore, E[J(·)] is the payoff in a team.)28 This implies that both Ω and Ω˜ have same payoff if
and only if pi(ξ) = p˜i(ξ).
Suppose that both problems have the same payoff. However, the payoff of Ω is bound below by
Ω˜ since the partially nested information structure has more information than non-nested one.
28Theorem 1 (Chu 1972, pp.23)
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In order to find γ1, · · · , γN for Ω such that resulting pi(ξ) is equal to p˜i(ξ), Chu (1972) proved
following theorem and corollary:
Theorem 2 (Chu 1972, pp.24): Define p˜∗i as the composite control corresponding to the optimal
control γ˜∗i of Ω˜ for each i; and define functions
gi(ξ) = ηi(ξ, p˜
∗
1(ξ), p˜
∗
1(ξ), · · · , p˜∗i−1(ξ)),∀i
If there exists some functions ri from Zi to Ui such that p˜
∗
i = rigi,∀i, then (γ1, · · · , γN ) is optimal
for problem Ω and they are equivalent to (γ˜∗1 , · · · , γ˜∗N ) of the problem Ω˜.
Suppose that gi is invertible for all i. By theorem 2, γi = p˜
∗
i g
∗−1
i for all i. Therefore,
p1(ξ) = γ1η1(ξ) = r1η1(ξ) = [p˜
∗
1g
−1
1 ]g1(ξ) = p˜
∗
1. By the recursive, it can be obtained that
pN = γNηN (ξ; p1(ξ), · · · , pN−1(ξ)) = rNηN (ξ, p˜1(ξ), · · · , p˜N (ξ)) = [p˜∗Ng−1N ]gN (ξ) = p˜∗N (ξ). Follow-
ing corollary can be obtained:
Corollary(Chu 1972, pp.24): If gi is invertible for all i, the optimal control laws for problem Ω can
be found and they are equivalent to those of problem, Ω˜.
In sum, if the dynamic-problem with the linear law of control, then the solution of this problem can
be obtained through the solution of the static-team problem by Radner (1962)’s theorem. However,
partially nested information structure is not general information structure in dynamic-team. Due
to this problem, Chu (1972) constructed the auxiliary problem, that is, the dynamic-team problem
with partially nested information structure. If both the dynamic-team problem with partially
nested one and one with non-nested one have the same payoff using the composite control function,
pi and p˜i, by theorem 1 in Chu (1972), both have the equivalent control. In this case, the dynamic-
team with non-nested information structure can be solved by the solution of the static-team. As
shown above, however, some special function (ri) is needed for pi to be equal to p˜i. Moreover, this
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procedure cannot guarantee that both team problems have the same payoff even if the composite
control function in each problem is obtained. (See figure 1.3)
1.2.5 Numerical Solution to Derive the Optimal Monetary Policy
Under this information structure, the optimal monetary policy can be derived as follows29:
Step 1. Construct auxiliary (partially nested) information structure.
z˜1 = z1 = ξ z˜2 = z2 = ξ
z˜3 =

z1
z2
z3
 =

ξ
ξ
u1 + u2 + ξ

Because information is updated to final decision maker, that is, partially nested information struc-
ture is assumed, redundant information can be deleted. In this case, information structure in a
dynamic-team is same one in a static-team. Therefore, equivalently, optimal decision in a dynamic-
team is
zˆ1 = ξ zˆ2 = ξ zˆ3 = ξ (1.6)
For simplicity, it is assume that
Q =

2 1 1
1 2 1
1 1 2
 S =

1
1
1
 C = 0 Pr(ξ) = N(0, σ
2)
29For more examples, see Chu (1972)
23
The optimal solution of auxiliary problem given auxiliary information structure is

u˜∗1
u˜∗2
u˜∗3
 = −Q
−1Sξ =

3/4 −1/4 −1/4
−1/4 3/4 −1/4
−1/4 −1/4 3/4


1
1
1
 ξ =

1/4
1/4
1/4
 ξ =
1
4

1
1
1
 ξ
or
u˜∗1 = −
1
4
z˜1 u˜
∗
2 = −
1
4
z˜2 u˜
∗
3 = −
1
4
[
1 0 0
]
z˜3 (1.7)
From (7), composite control corresponding to the optimal control for auxiliary problem is
p˜∗1(ξ) = p˜
∗
2(ξ) = p˜
∗
3(ξ) = −
1
4
ξ (1.8)
and
J˜∗ = E

1
2
[
u˜∗1 u˜∗2 u˜∗3
]

2 1 1
1 2 1
1 1 2


u˜∗1
u˜∗2
u˜∗3
+
[
u˜∗1 u˜∗2 u˜∗3
]

1
1
1
 ξ

= E

1
2
[
−14 z˜1 −14 z˜2 −14 z˜3
]

2 1 1
1 2 1
1 1 2


−14 z˜1
−14 z˜2
−14 z˜3
+
[
−14 z˜1 −14 z˜2 −14 z˜3
]

1
1
1
 ξ

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= E

1
2ξ
2
[
−14 −14 −14
]

2 1 1
1 2 1
1 1 2


−14
−14
−14
+ ξ
2
[
−14 −14 −14
]

1
1
1


= E

1
2ξ
2
[
−1 −1 −1
]

−14
−14
−14
−
3
4ξ
2
 = E
[
1
2ξ
2 3
4 − 34ξ2
]
=
3
8
σ2 − 6
8
σ2 = −3
8
σ2
Step 2. Substitute p∗i (ξ) into zi
g1(ξ) = z1 = ξ
g2(ξ) = z2 = ξ
g3(ξ) = ξ + p˜
∗
1(ξ) + p˜
∗
2(ξ) =
1
2
ξ
By corollary, the optimal controls for team are
u∗1 = γ
∗(z1) = p˜∗1g
−1
1 (z1) = −
1
4
z1
u∗2 = γ
∗(z2) = p˜∗2g
−1
2 (z2) = −
1
4
z2
u∗3 = γ
∗(z3) = p˜∗3g
−1
3 (z3) = −
1
4
(
2
1
)z3 = −1
2
z3
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and the optimal payoff function J∗ corresponding to above is
J∗ = E

1
2ξ
2
[
−14 −14 −12
]

2 1 1
1 2 1
1 1 2


−14
−14
−12
+ ξ
2
[
−14 −14 −12
]

1
1
1


= E

1
2ξ
2
[
−54 −54 −54
]

−14
−14
−14
− ξ
2

= E
[
1
2ξ
2 5
4 − ξ2
]
=
5
8
σ2 − 8
8
σ2 = −3
8
σ2
Because both J˜∗ and J∗ have same value given control variables, the optimal decision in this team
situation is
u∗3 =
1
2
z3 =
1
2
[u∗1 + u
∗
2 + ξ] =
1
2
[−1
4
ξ +−1
4
ξ + ξ] =
1
4
ξ (1.9)
.
As mentioned above, since ξ is known as the state of nature to the decision maker, simply optimal
decision is function of observations based on the state of nature.30 In other words, optimal decision
is u∗3 =
1
4η(ξ) =
1
4z. This implies that optimal monetary policy depends on how committee members
estimate the state of nature with imperfect observation of the event or how they extract the signal
of the event. Therefore optimal decision is the making decision under imperfect observation or
signal extraction problem.31 For example, suppose that the observation, z, is realization of a linear
30In control theory, under some assumptions, the optimal control problem could be solved by the optimal observation
problem, or optimal estimation problem. Typically, this is known as the separation principle. If we assume that there
is asymmetric information problem between central bank and private agents, for example, the situation in Barro and
Gordon (1983), the separation principle does not hold. Especially, according to Aoki (2003), the optimal estimation
or optimal observation is depending on choice of policy if there is the failure of the separation principle
31According to Swanson (2004), certainty-equivalence problem is arise in case of signal extraction problem. In this
26
function of ξ or law of motion of state of nature. Thus,
z = Aξ
where A is a known coefficient matrix of appropriate dimension to the state of nature. Typically,
as in Taylor rule, observation could be combination of two elements in the state of nature,
z = a1ξ1 + a2ξ2 (1.10)
In (10), underlying state of the economy, ξ, would be policymakers’ optimal estimation, ξˆ. This
implies that
z = a1ξˆ1 + a2ξˆ2 + ν (1.11)
where ν is the persistent revision or noise or forecasting error. (In here, policy disturbance can be
seen as forecasting error using real-time estimate.) Therefore, if it is assumed that the policymakers
use output gap and inflation gap as indicator variable for the economy
z = a1(y − y∗) + a2(pi − pi∗) + ν (1.12)
Finally, optimal monetary policy in team situation is, (In here, the decision variable is the interest
case, as uncertainty surrounding the economy or uncertainty about indicator variable is increased, coefficients of policy
rule responded to the economy is attenuated.
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rate.)32
r =
1
4
[a1(y − y∗) + a2(pi − pi∗) + ν] (1.13)
As seen before, this optimal monetary policy is consistent with Taylor (1993). The only difference
between these two is this rule is based on team decision-making process, whereas Taylor’s is not. In
addition, optimal rule under team situation is not restrictive to add additional or different variables
on Taylor compared to single agent problem. This is because team situation depends on how they
perceive the situation through the economic indicators so that the observation could be combination
of different kind of elements. Therefore, many different type of policy rule could be derived without
amending the Fed’s objective function.
1.3 Conclusion - The optimal monetary policy under team situa-
tion
According to Goodfriend (1991), Federal funds rate has been adjusted when there is new informa-
tion updated to Fed.33 In this vein, the optimal policy decision-making could be a signal extraction
problem since the information signals what happens in the economy. In this chapter, using team
theory, optimal policy decision-making is simplified by signal extraction problem under the con-
dition in which the separation principle holds. Even with very different micro-foundation, it is
found that Taylor rule (Taylor 1993) is still satisfied under the different optimization mechanism,
committee decision-making.
In addition to this, this chapter also provides that optimal monetary policy depends on how individ-
32Typically, y∗ is assumed as natural output. But, empirically, it can not be measurable. Due to this problem, in
some case, instead of y∗, yˆ∗, estimation of natural output, is used. As mentioned in Swanson (2004), the former is
signal extraction problem, the latter is imperfect observation problem. In order to avoid the problem of certainty-
equivalence, it is assumed that y∗ = yˆ∗
33The property of interest-rate targeting is well described in Goodfriend (1991)
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ual decision-maker in the committee observes the economic situation through economic indicators.
This implies that various type of Taylor rule is available based on the observations. Put simply,
optimal monetary policy can be modified by which information they will choose or which indicators
they will use to update their information sets. According to Rudebusch (2006), the deviation of
Taylor rule from acutual funds rates could be explained by macroeconomic developments, such as
credit crunch, inflation or deflation scare. This implies that Federal Reserve appears to respond to
not only current output gap and inflation gap but also additional information or indicators about
the development.34 In other words,the Taylor rule with only 2 components would be an inaccurate
description of the actual monetary policy.
Even with this success, one weakness of the analysis is that, due to its complexity of team decision-
making or committee decision-making, each member in the committee is assumed to be a rational
observer. In other words, each agents’ observing the event has same variance. This implies that
all agents in a team transmit the information without strategic action. If some agents transmit
the information strategically, they will communicate with or report noisy information even though
they observe or have the same information. Therefore, assuming the same variance cannot be
appropriate.35
34Many proxies for financial market stability is used to explain.
35Related to this, herding behavior in forecasting, is one to be able to explain why each agent has similar observation
or forecasting under uncertain situation. According to Laster, Bennett and Geoum (1999) ”if all forecasters have
similar information and seek accuracy-consistent with the demands of intensive [forecasting data] users-their projection
will cluster tightly around a consensus.” (pp.298) In constrats with this, there is the deviation from consensus if
forecasting agent has any incentive to deviate from that, for example, reputation or wages. The former effect is called
”far-to-fall” effect, the latter is called ”tighter priors” one. Because the magnitude of each effect depends on which
industry forecasting agents are belong to, it is easy to determine whether forecasting or expectation is herding or not.
For detail, see Lamont (2002)
Chapter 2
Fool in the shower
2.1 Introduction
” The first time to turn on the water in the shower, needless to say, it is cold. Foolishly, the fool
turns the knob to hot, and he gets too hot. So he turns knob to cold. He is doing this again and
again, finally he only gets scalded when the water heats up with predicted lag”
The ”Fool in the shower”, metaphor points out that if government cannot recognizes that
the monetary policy can affect the economy with a lag or observed data for policy is real-time data,
as pointed by Orphanides (2001) and Orphanides (2003), this policy is not effective as much as
their decision-making based on ex-ante expectation. Due to this reason, Milton Friedman criticized
its effectiveness of stabilization policy and argued that the Fed should to try to keep the money
supply constant with small adjustments.
From Friedman’s metaphor of ”Fool in the shower”, it is reasonable to include time lags in commit-
tee decision-making. As it is well known, there are three kinds of time lags in stabilization policy,
recognition lags, administrative lags, and response lags. Recognition lags indicates that it takes
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time for each member to recognize the current economic situation as a boom or sluggish market
because it takes time to gather the data to check what is going on the economy. Administrative
lags suggest that it takes time to make or announce the decision for appropriate stabilization policy.
In contrast with these, response lags is due to how much time it takes for stabilization poliy to
be effective in the economy. Among three lags, the main difference is that recognition lags and
response lags are internal lags while response lags are external lags.1 Therefore, based on internal
lags, it is reasonable to assume that there are internal lags when the committee decides its optimal
decision-making.
In line with this, many researchers, especially monetary policy economists, try to incorporate this
kind of lags. ”Specifically, researcher might try to represent more realistically the lags between
changes in target variables and the policymaker’s perceptions of the changes. More also needs to
be done to enhance the comparability of the specification of policy regimes and shocks for models
with different time frequencies.” (Bryant, Hooper and Mann 1993, pp. 36) In order to incorporate
these lags into committee decision-making or team decision-making, we need to know the properties
of each data-set, for example, inflation, GDP, and unemployment, or NAIRU (Non-Accelerating
Inflation Rate of Unemployment). This is because, as shown above, optimal decision-making
could be based on which information or more specifically, which economic indicators each agent
used. Typically, data-generating procedure is very different from the institution-to-institution,
indicator-to-indicator, or frequecy. Therefore it is very unrealistic for decision-makers to pretend
that they make decisions about optimal monetary policy based on current-realization or the revised
data of economic indicators. McCallum (1999) argued that ”it is reasonable to assume that
contemporaneous observations are available for interest rates, exchange rates, or other asset-market
1The model example for external lag is financial accelerator model.(Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist 2000). In this
model, due to financial market, Federal Funds rate can affect the economy through the interest rates in financial
market. Therefore, its effectiveness depends on not only indirect effective rather than direct one but also relatively
slower than one without financial sector.
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prices. It would be unreasonable, however, to make such an assumption for nominal GDP (or
GNP) or price level.” (pp. 1517)2
Under a hierarchy structure, therefore, the information updated to agents depends on at which
stage the agent is. In other words, most newly updated information is only available to relatively
highly ranked decision-maker(s) or final decision-maker(s). In figure 2.1, after period T-1, since
newly generated data are only available to final decision-maker due to the lag of data-generating
process, the recognition between member 1 and 2 and final decision-maker is different. Therefore
since this difference is due to the time difference of access to data-set, its recognition difference
could be the one pointed out by Orphanides (2001) and Orphanides (2003).3 In addition to this,
there is one kind of administrative lag for making and announcing the final optimal decision in
figure 2.1 since all decisions are not made simultaneously in decision-making procedure.
Moreover, because there is no communication between member 1 and member 2 due to the
hierarchical structure in the artificial FOMC, both member 1 and member 2 have different points
of view. (Meade and Sheets 2005) This difference is fully based on recognition difference or, as
mentioned above, their regional difference. In other words, the regional economic concern which
belongs to member 1 or 2 is more important than national-wide economic concern when each Fed
committee member decides its monetary policy and this makes each member different even if the
same information structure or the same accuracy were available to each member. This implies that
they could have regional biased perception, e.g., biased observation which deviates from consensus.
Under different data-generating process for each agent due to the hierarchical structure, it is reason-
able to regard committee decision-making as a gradual decision process. This is because their data-
2In addition to this, McCallum (1999) also mentioned that it is also important to decide how to measure the time-
series data, for example, growth-rate or growth-level, that is, difference-stationary or trend-stationary. Of course,
traditional view is that important macroeconomic variables are difference-stationary, also supported by Nelson and
Plosser (1982). However, if it is employed wrong measurement, policy effect would be very different to its intention.
3Typically, data revision or updating would take much more time than assumed in here. Therefore, it would not
be reasonable to make the different access to data. As mentioned above, however, it would be reasonable in case of
interest rate, exchange rates, or other asset-market price. This is because the frequency of this data is highly frequent.
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Figure 2.1: Decision-making procedure in artificial FOMC.
generating process heavily relies on the timeliness of the data. In line with this, the decision-making
in monetary policy also follows the data-generating process. Therefore gradualism in decision-
making is the natural result. (Goodfriend 1991)
Due to gradualism or the inertial movement property, most literature searched for the root of this
property in monetary policy. (In figure 2.2, it can be seen that there are no abrupt change in the
Federal Funds Rates. At the really least, it can be seen that it takes time for the Federal funds rate
to changes direction.) Empirically, the estimation of the coefficient of the lagged interest rate is
between 0.6 and 0.8 and statistically significant even with different subsample. (Clarida, Gali and
Gertler 2000) Rudebusch (2002), however, argued that the significance of the lagged interest rate
would reflect serial correlated errors, and showed low predictive power of term structure for future
fund rate in terms of R2. In sum, the reason for interest rate inertia is still controversial and an in-
conclusive issue even though gradualism is common property in each assertion. Theoretically, there
are very different reasons to explain gradualism, such as minimizing financial volatility (Cuikerman
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1991), long term-structure (Goodfriend 1991), and political responsibility, (Goodhart 1997).
In sum, it could be concluded that the gradualism in monetary policy is based on timeliness of
data-generating problem which is due to the discrepancy between revised and real time data, and
this could be another reason to assume the gradualism under committee decision-making in this
chapter.
Figure 2.2: Movement of Effective Federal Funds Rates
2.2 Numerical Solution to Derive the Optimal Monetary Policy
Under Lags
Given the timeliness of the data due to the hierarchy, the optimal monetary policy can be derived
as follows.
Step 1. Construct the auxiliary information structure.
z˜1,t = z1,t = ξ1,t z˜2,t = z2,t = ξ2,t
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z˜3,t+1 =

z1,t
z2,t
z3,t+1
 =

ξt
ξt
u1,t + u2,t + ξ3,t+1

Even though we assume partially nested information structure in order to delete redundant infor-
mation, there will still be the time lags for decision-making due to delayed observation. Due to
partially nested information structure, however, the information structure in a dynamic-team is
zˆ1,t = ξ1,t zˆ2,t = ξ2,t zˆ3,t+1 = ξ3,t+1 (2.1)
For simplicity, again, it is assumed that
Q =

2 1 1
1 2 1
1 1 2
 S =

1
1
1
 C = 0 Pr(ξ) = N(0, σ
2
t )
In here, measurement noise or random disturbance, ξ, implies that it is not white noise. Therefore it
has the non-constant variance, but no serial correlation.4 The optimal solution of auxiliary problem
given the auxiliary information structure is

u˜∗1,t
u˜∗2,t
u˜∗3,t+1
 = −Q
−1Sξ =

3/4 −1/4 −1/4
−1/4 3/4 −1/4
−1/4 −1/4 3/4


1
1
1
 ξ =

1/4
1/4
1/4
 ξ =
1
4

1
1
1
 ξ
4Due to recognition difference or recognition lags, each has different observation. Therefore its measurement error
is different to each other. In this point of view, the non-constant variance is assumed
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or
u˜∗1,t = −
1
4
z˜1,t u˜
∗
2,t = −
1
4
z˜2,t u˜
∗
3,t+1 = −
1
4
[
1 0 0
]
z˜3,t+1 (2.2)
From (2.2), composite control corresponding to the optimal control for the auxiliary problem is
p˜∗1(ξ) = p˜
∗
2(ξ) = p˜
∗
3(ξ) = −
1
4
ξ (2.3)
and
J˜∗ = E

1
2
[
u˜∗1,t u˜∗2,t u˜∗3,t+1
]

2 1 1
1 2 1
1 1 2


u˜∗1,t
u˜∗2,t
u˜∗3,t+1
+
[
u˜∗1,t u˜∗2,t u˜∗3,t+1
]

1
1
1
 ξ

= E

1
2
[
−14 z˜1,t −14 z˜2,t −14 z˜3,t+1
]

2 1 1
1 2 1
1 1 2


−14 z˜1,t
−14 z˜2,t
−14 z˜3,t+1
+
[
−14 z˜1,t −14 z˜2,t −14 z˜3,t+1
]

1
1
1
 ξ

= E

1
2
[
(−12 z˜1,t − 14 z˜2,t − 14 z˜3,t+1) (−14 z˜1,t − 12 z˜2,t − 14 z˜3,t+1) (−12 z˜1,t − 14 z˜2,t − 12 z˜3,t+1)
]

−14 z˜1,t
−14 z˜2,t
−14 z˜3,t+1


+ E

[
−14 z˜1,t −14 z˜2,t −14 z˜3,t+1
]

1
1
1
 ξ

=
1
2
E[(−1
2
z˜1,t − 1
4
z˜2,t − 1
4
z˜3,t+1) · (−1
4
z˜1,t) + (−1
4
z˜1,t − 1
2
z˜2,t − 1
4
z˜3,t+1) · (−1
4
z˜2,t)
+ (−1
2
z˜1,t − 1
4
z˜2,t − 1
2
z˜3,t+1) · (−1
4
z˜3,t+1)] + E[−1
4
z˜21,t −
1
4
z˜22,t −
1
4
z˜23,t+1]
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= E[−1
8
z˜21,t −
1
8
z˜22,t −
1
8
z˜23,t+1 +
1
8
z˜1,tz˜2,t +
1
8
z˜1,tz˜3,t+1 +
1
8
z˜2,tz˜3,t+1]
= −1
8
V ar(z˜1,t)− 1
8
V ar(z˜2,t)− 1
8
V ar(z˜3,t+1) +
1
8
Cov(z˜1,tz˜2,t) +
1
8
Cov(z˜1,tz˜3,t+1) +
1
8
Cov(z˜2,tz˜3,t+1)
Step 2. Substitute p∗i (ξ) into zi
g1(ξ) = z1,t = ξ
g2(ξ) = z2,t = ξ
g3(ξ) = ξ + p˜
∗
1(ξ) + p˜
∗
2(ξ) =
1
2
ξ
By corollary, again, if gi is invertible for all i, the optimal control laws for the team can be found,
and they are equivalent to the optimal control of auxiliary problem, the optimal controls for team
are
u∗1,t = γ
∗(z1,t) = p˜∗1g
−1
1 (z1,t) = −
1
4
z1,t
u∗2,t = γ
∗(z2,t) = p˜∗2g
−1
2 (z2,t) = −
1
4
z2,t
u∗3,t+1 = γ
∗(z3,t+1) = p˜∗3g
−1
3 (z3,t) = −
1
4
(
2
1
)z3,t+1 = −1
2
z3,t+1
and the optimal payoff function J∗ corresponding to the optimal control is
J∗ = E

1
2
[
−14z1,t −14z2,t −12z3,t+1
]

2 1 1
1 2 1
1 1 2


−14z1,t
−14z2,t
−12z3,t+1
+
[
−14z1,t −14z2,t −12z3,t+1
]

1
1
1
 ξ

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= E[−1
8
z˜21,t −
1
8
z˜22,t +
1
8
z˜1,tz˜2,t +
1
4
z˜1,tz˜3,t+1 +
1
4
z˜2,tz˜3,t+1]
= −1
8
V ar(z˜1,t)− 1
8
V ar(z˜2,t) +
1
8
Cov(z˜1,tz˜2,t) +
1
4
Cov(z˜1,tz˜3,t+1) +
1
4
Cov(z˜2,tz˜3,t+1)
Because both J˜∗ and J∗ do not have the same value given control variables, the general solution
of this case is not known. Especially this case is the ”FIND LINEAR SUBOPTIMAL DECISION
FOR Ω.”5 (See figure 1.3). To resolve such a problem, the difference between J˜∗ and J∗ is calculated
as follows:
J˜∗ − J∗ = −1
8
V ar(z˜3,t+1)− 1
8
Cov(z˜1,tz˜3,t+1)− 1
8
Cov(z˜2,tz˜3,t+1)
For both to be equal to each other, we must have
V ar(z˜3,t+1) = −Cov(z˜1,tz˜3,t+1)− Cov(z˜2,tz˜3,t+1)
Since variance can not have negative value, one of two components on RHS, at least, must a
negative value and be larger than the other one. Typically, the more accurate observation member
1 or member 2 makes, the less variance the final decision-maker has. This implies that covariance
between the member and final decision-maker is positive. In this case, as mentioned above, general
solution would not be available. If a regional bias exists, however, then, the final decision-maker
puts more weight on national-wide issue while the member is biased to regional issues. In this case,
it could be possible to have a negative covariance.6
For example, suppose that the member is concerned about unemployment in his or her region,
whereas the final decision-maker is concerned about the inflation rate. In this example, the difference
in their observations or interest leads to a negative relation due to the Phillips curve.
5This could be one example mentioned in Witsenhausen (1968)
6This argument is based on Meade and Sheets (2005)’s findings
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Because both J˜∗ and J∗ could have the same value under this situation, the optimal decision in
this team situation is
u∗3,t+1 =
1
2
z3,t+1 =
1
2
[u∗1,t + u
∗
2,t + ξt+1] =
1
2
[−1
4
ξ1,t +−1
4
ξ2,t + ξ3,t+1] (2.4)
This equation is rewritten by
u∗3,t = −
1
8
ξ1,t−1 +−1
8
ξ2,t−1 +
1
2
ξ3,t (2.5)
Since optimal decision is function of the state of nature, equation (2.5) gives
ut3,t = −
1
8
[(a1,1 + a1,2)(yt−1 − y∗) + (a2,1 + a2,2)(pit−1 − pi∗) + νt−1]
+
1
2
[a1,3(yt − y∗) + a2,3(pit − pi∗) + νt]
(2.6)
Where ai,t is the coefficient of each agent on each variables. Because rt = a1(yt− y∗) + a2(pit− pi∗),
finally, inertial interest rate equation is derived.
rt = λrt−1 + βy(yt − y∗) + βpi(pit − pi∗) + t (2.7)
Where λ = −18 , βpi = 12a2,3, βy = 12a1,3, and t = 12νt − 18νt−1. This equation implies that inertial
interest rate is due to both lagged interest rate in optimal policy and serial correlation in the error
term. According to English, Nelson and Sack (2003), allowing both lagged interest rate and serial
correlated errors result in both play important role in explaining intertial interest rate. However,
the relative importance of lagged interest rate and serial correlation is still open question. In this
sense, at least, above inertial policy response under the committee decision-making is successful to
capture the dynamics of interest rates.
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2.3 Conclusion: Gradualism vs. Persistent Shock
”the debate about the source of gradualism is on going and I cannot hope to render a definitive
verdict today on the relative merits of these rationales.” Bernanke, Ben, May 20th, 2004 Speech.
The interest rate inertia is one central feature in explaining the central bank’s reaction func-
tion. To capture this feature, many literatures have introduced the gradualism or persistent shock
in the policy reaction function. Theoretically, incorporating the penalty on the difference in interest
rate into the loss function have been introduced to derive the inertial policy reaction function.
This is because this allows for interest rate smoothing , that is, gradualism in policy reaction.7 As
pointed out by Brainard (1967), the aggressive policy response to the economic situation under
uncertainty would not be optimal. Therefore, it has to be cautious to implement the policy. In
this sense, Ben Bernanke indicates the gradualism preference of the Fed in his 2004 speech, ”My
sense, though, is that policymakers’ caution in the face of many forms of uncertainty and their
desire to make policy as predictable as possible both contribute to the gradualist behavior we seem
to observe in practice.” In this chapter, even without resorting to incorporate ad-hoc interest rate
smoothing in loss function, inertial optimal policy is derived from the lags.8 Especially, inertial
policy response under the committee decision-making captures both partial adjustment and serial
correlated errors to account for dynamics of interest rate. As mentioned above, however, this
conclusion does not answer if partial adjustment or serial correlated errors has a larger impact on
the inertia. This is is an empirical matter to which we will turn into the next chapter.
7If discounting factor in loss function is greater, that is β →∞, this may lead to less concern about the smoothing.
Hence the discounting factor would be restrictive to get smoothing behavior. See Dennis (2006)
8The Gradual monetary policy is also derived from learning process under uncertainty. See Sack (1998-34)
Chapter 3
Empirical Estimation of the
Gradualism
3.1 Introduction
One of main property in policy response to the economy is inertial policy response or the gradualism
in policy response. To capture this property, many studies in the literature explore the reason for
the inertia. Some studies in the literatures theoretically conclude that the gradualism is the result of
minimizing financial volatility (Cuikerman 1991), long term-structure (Goodfriend 1991), or politi-
cal responsibility, (Goodhart 1997). In contrast, the empirical estimation for the inertia gives partial
evidence for the gradualism. In a seminal paper, Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000) estimated the par-
tial adjustment form, it = (1−ρ)i∗t +ρit−1, i∗t = i∗+β(pit−pi∗)+γxt, where pit is percentage change
in price level, pi∗ is target inflation, and xt is a measure of the avarage output gap. The estimation
of the coefficient of lagged interest rate (ρ) is between 0.6 and 0.8 and statistically significant even
with in different subsample. Rudebusch (2002), however, argued that the significance of the lagged
interest rate would reflect serially correlated errors, and showed low predictive power of term struc-
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ture for future fund rate in terms of R2. when partial adjustment form was employed. Rudebusch
(2002) estimated serially correlated shock form, it = βpit+γxt+ξt, ξt = δξt−1 +ωt, where pit is aver-
age (four quarters) inflation and showed that δ was 0.91 and statistically significant. Even with two
different conclusions, English, Nelson and Sack (2003) estimate the policy rule allowing both partial
adjustments and serially correlated errors, ∆it = (1−λ)∆it+(1−λ)(1−ρ)(ˆit−1−it−1)+λρ∆it−1+,
and iˆt−1 = b0 + bpipit + byyt, where λ and ρ are the partial adjustment parameter and the serial
correlation parameter. The first term captures the partial movement of the interest rate to the most
recent change while remaining term reflects intertia of interest rate changes. English, Nelson and
Sack (2003) show that λ = 0.58 and ρ = 0.75 and conclude that the inertial movement is the result
of the sum of the lagged interest rate and serially correlated errors.
To disentangle two different sources of inertia, using DSGE model, Carrillo, Feve and Matheron
(2007) estimate both the partial adjustment and serially correlated error parameters with the differ-
ent parameter restrictions. Under the different parameter restrictions, Carrillo, Feve and Matheron
(2007) calculate the Impulse Response Functions (IRFs) of output, inflation, wage inflation, money
growth, and Federal Funds rate based on both Structural Vector Autoregression and DSGE model
and conclude that the dynamics of each variable is better fitted with moderate gradualism and a
high degree of serial correlation. (ρ = 0.2976, δ = 0.8740) In line with this, Coibion and Gorod-
nichenko (2012) employ real time data, Greenbook data, and estimate the equation which allows
both the partial adjustment and serially correlated errors. Even with different datasets, Coibion
and Gorodnichenko (2012) show that the coefficient of lagged interest rate and the coefficient of
serially correlated errors are 0.83 and 0.55 and are statistically significant.
As this brief literature surveys shows, the empirical literature on the determinants of interest rate
inertia is still controversial and inconclusive even though the inertia is common feature in each of
these studies. In this chapter, using partial forward-looking model, we will show in our empirical
42
study that intertial movement is the results of the sum of the lagged interest rate and serially cor-
related error and the inertia due to the lagged coefficient in monetary policy and the persistence
error is more likely to support inertia relative to the persistence errors only. This result would be
contrast with English, Nelson and Sack (2003).
3.2 Basic Model
When policymakers set optimal monetary policy, their decision making is subject to the economic
variables which policymakers observe. Therefore the movement or interaction of the economic
variables could be the policy constraints, and the model capturing the movement or interaction of
the economic variables is the important one to explain how policy makers are subject to. In this point
of view, some studies in the literatures, e.g., Dennis (2006), and Ozlale (2003), employed the model
for policy constraints developed by Rudebusch and Svensson (1999). Since this model is backward-
looking model, Soderstrom, Soderlind and Vrdin (2005) allow the degree of forward-looking model
behavior in this model. In theoretical modeling, however, backward-looking and forward-looking
models are still controversial hypotheses. This is because each model gives very different implications
for stability, determinacy, and uniqueness1. In this chapter, since the perception about the state
are the main ingredient in setting the policy rule, forward-looking model is more reasonable.
Since output and inflation are most the important constraints to policy makers, the following output
and inflation dynamics are employed:
yt = a0 + a1yt−1 + a2Et−1yt + a3[it − pit] + gt
pit = b0 + b1pit−1 + b2Et−1pit + b3Et−1pit+1 + b4Et−1pit+2 + b5yt−1 + νt
1For details, see Cochrane (2011)
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Where yt is quarterly real GDP, pit is quarterly CPI on basis of 2005, and it is quarterly federal funds
rate.2 As usual Et−1 is expectation operator. The error terms, gt and νt, are demand and supply
shock, respectively. Compared to Rudebusch and Svensson (1999)’s empirical backward-looking
model, this model is partial forward-looking. The practical problem rises here is how to specify the
forward-looking expectation. For this purpose, the Greenbook data is used to generate expectation
variables. The Greenbook is produced before each meeting of the Federal Open Market Committee.
Using an assumption about monetary policy, the Research staff at the Board of Governors prepares
projections about how the economy will fare in the future. These projections are made available
to the public after a lag of five years. 3 Since the Greenbook data provides the expected future
growth rate of annualized percentage change, we employ the formula, gm = [(
Xm
Xm−1 )
4 − 1] · 100, to
construct the expected value of each variable, where gm is the annualized percentage change, Xm
is the expected value of each variable, and Xm−1 is the actual data.
In addition the monetary policy rule is as follows:
it = f0 + f1Et−1pit + f2Et−1yt + f3it−1 + t (3.1)
where, following the literature, it is assumed that shocks have long memory and follow an AR(1)
process, t = ρt−1 + ξt, where the value of ρ is to be determined empirically. Finally, full system of
equations are as follows:
yt = a0 + a1yt−1 + a2Et−1yt + a3[it − pit] + gt
2This rate is the interest rate controlled by the Fed, which each bank charges to each other for unsecured loan for
overnight.
3See http://www.philadelphiafed.org/research-and-data/real-time-center/greenbook-data/
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pit = b0 + b1pit−1 + b2Et−1pit + b3Et−1pit+1 + b4Et−1pit+2 + b5yt−1 + νt
it = f0 + f1Et−1pit + f2Et−1yt + f3it−1 + t
In this system of equations4, first equation can be seen as the IS curve while second equation is the
Phillips curve, and the last equation is the monetary policy rule. In the Phillips curve, the equation
shows that the inflation can be explained by the combination of the weighted sum of expected future
inflation and the lagged inflation and output. In the traditional Phillips curve, the inflation depends
on the output gap and the expected inflation term, which implies a cost-push effect on the inflation.
In order to capture the persistence of the inflation, however, it includes the lagged inflation term.
Moreover, output is used instead of the output gap. As mentioned in many studies in the literature,
the measurement error of the output gap is large because of the difficulty of measuring the natural
level of output. Due to this problem, Gali and Gertler (1999) employed the marginal cost derived
from the unit labor cost. However, in this chapter we employ output since output consists of two real
marginal costs, labor and capital, under Cobb-Douglas technology.5 In case of the policy rule, the
lagged interest rate term and the persistent shocks are added to traditional Taylor rule to capture
the inertia in monetary policy. Given this system of equations, the main objective in this estimation
is to check whether there is persistence in the errors, i.e., whether ρ ≤ 1 and the lagged inflation
term is significant.
4Most studies in the literature estimated the monetary policy using single-equation. As pointed out by Rudebusch
(2002), the additional information, for instance, term-structure, is needed to disentangle the inertia from partial
adjustment or serially correlated shock. In this vein, Rudebusch and Wu (2008) employed Macro-Finance model,
which includes two aggregate relationships for output and inflation on the basis of term-structure.
5According to Euler theorem, MPL · L + MPK ·K = Y . Since MPL and MPK are equal to real wage and real
interest rate, respectively, Y can be used as cost.
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3.3 Estimating the System
To estimate the system of equations, the IS curve, the Phillips curve and the monetary policy can
be rewritten as
Yt = A0 +A1Yt−1 +A2Et−1Yt +A3Et−1Yt+1 +A4Et−1Yt+2 + ωt (3.2)
Defining
Yt =
[
yt pit it
]
ωt =
[
gt νt t
]
, A0 =

a0
b0
f0
 A1 =

a1 −a3 a3
b5 b1 0
0 0 f3

A2 =

a2 0 0
0 b2 0
f2 f1 0
 A3 =

0 0 0
0 b3 0
0 0 0
 A4 =

0 0 0
0 b4 0
0 0 0

In here,

gt
νt
t
 =

0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 ρ
 ·

gt−1
νt−1
t−1
+

gt
νt
ξt

The various methods employed in the literature can be split into Maximum Likelihood Estimation
(hereafter MLE) and General Methods of Moments (hereafter GMM). In the econometrics litera-
ture, the main difference between them is that MLE is not applicable when the full shape of the
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distribution of the data is not known. In addition, MLE requires the rational expectation model
can be solved only by observable structure or reduced form while GMM does not. Even with this,
however, GMM has the problems as ’over-instrumenting’ or ’over-correction.’6 Since the expected
variables are known based on the Greenbook data, the rational expectation structure can be fully
known. Therefore, we can employ MLE to estimate with less loss of efficiency compared to GMM.
The joint probabilty density function (PDF) for the data can be defined as follows:
P ({Yt}T1 ; θ,Ψ) = P ({Yt}T6 |{Yt}51; θ,Ψ) · P ({Yt}51; θ,Ψ) (3.3)
Where Ψ is variance-covariance matrix of the disturbance vector, ω, θ = {a0, a1, a2, a3, b0, b1,
b2, b3, b4, b5, f0, f1, f2, f3, ρ}, and T is sample size including initial conditions. It is postulated that
ωt|{yi}t1 ∼ N(0,Ψ) for all t. From (3.2), therefore, the joint probability density function for {Yt}T1
can be defined as follows:7
P ({Yt}T1 ; θ,Ψ) = [
1
(2pi)
n(T−5)
2
|Ψ−1| (T−5)2 (1− ρ2) 12 exp
T∑
t=6
(−1
2
ω′tΨ
−1ωt)] (3.4)
Where n is the number of endogenous variables,yt, pit, it. From (3.4), quasi-log-likelihood function
can be obtained:
lnL(θ,Ψ; {Yt}T1 ) ∝ −
n(T − 5)
2
ln(2pi)− (T − 5)
2
ln|Ψ|+ 1
2
ln(1− ρ2)− 1
2
T∑
t−6
(ζ ′tΨ
−1ζt) (3.5)
6The problem of GMM in forward-looking model is well described in Mavroeidis (2003)
7This empirical methodology is based on Dennis (2006). The differences are forward-looking model and parameters
in policy rule.
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Where ζt =
[
gt νt ξt
]′
. Since Quasi Maximum Likelihood Estimation (QMLE) of Ψ is
Ψˆ(θ) =
T∑
t=6
ωˆtωˆt
T − 5
and concentrated quasi-log-likelihood function is
lnLc(θ,Ψ; {Yt}T1 ) ∝ −
n(T − 5)
2
ln(1 + 2pi)− (T − 5)
2
ln|Ψˆ(θ)|+ 1
2
ln(1− ρˆ2) (3.6)
3.4 Estimation Result
In the history the regime of Fed is characterized by three regimes: Borrowed Reserves, Non-borrowed
Reserves, and Federal Funds rate regime. Since each had very different policy instrument in the
regime, it would be reasonable to exclude Borrowed Reserve and Non-borrowed Reserve to estimate.
This is because Federal Funds rate is not a policy instrument in these regime. In other words, the
monetary policy was implemented by selling and buying government securities under Non-borrowed
Reserves or by the control of M1 or M2 under Total Reserves. 8 Therefore, the sample period begins
with 1982Q1 and ends in 2007Q3.9 In this estimation, the variables of interest are the coefficients
on lagged Federal Funds rate and persistent policy shock, f3 and ρ. If the empirical result supports
the inertia in monetary policy, then it can, at least, expect that either f3 or ρ is positive. The
estimation results are shown in Table 3.1.
All coefficients have the conventional sign except f1, the coefficient on expected inflation rate.
According to the Taylor principle, to stabilize the economy, the Fed not only follows the Taylor rule
but also it has to raise the nominal interest rate by more than one percentage when the inflation
is increased by one percentage point. This implies that f1 > 1 or at least f1 > 0. Under the
8see Bernanke and Mihov (1998)
9After this, the data is not available. This is because the data are released to the public with a lag of five years.
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Table 3.1: Quasi-FIML Estimation Results
IS Curve Phillips Curve
Parameter Pointe est. SD Parameter Pointe est. SD
a0 26.18138 39.99877 b0 0.397996 0.351084
a1 0.124530 0.133366 b1 0.101892 0.199143
a2 0.8777646 0.132408 b2 0.880373 0.060543
a3 -0.353350 1.447792 b3 0.465634 0.199683
b4 -0.461318 0.288504
b5 7.27E-05 4.31E-05
Federal Funds Rate Other Results
Parameter Pointe est. SD Log likelihood AIC SIC
f0 4.842922 1.659640 -504.9929 10.29268 10.68527
f1 -0.097283 0.043850
f2 0.000364 0.000201
f3 0.792079 0.047912
ρ 0.556321 0.118724
forward-looking model, however, the Fed expects the future inflation to be lower when policymaker
announces future higher interest rate. According to Rudebusch and Wu (2008), moreover, the
increase in underlying inflation factor (or perceived inflation objective) has two effect, one is directly
increase the short rate, and the other is indirectly decrease the short rate. Since the indirect effect
dominates the direct effect, the increase in inflation factor initially lowers the short rate. Most
importantly, Taylor rule is satisfied by observed data, that is, revised data. Therefore, it would be
reasonable to have a negative coefficient on expected inflation.
In addition, the coefficients on lagged Federal Funds rate and persistent policy shock are statistically
significant, consistent with English, Nelson and Sack (2003) This implies that both gradualism and
persistent shocks are important factors describing the movements of the Federal Funds rates. In
terms of the absolute value, however, the result is more likely to support the gradualism. In other
words, this result supports widely held beliefs, interest rate smoothing, that is, there is no sudden
change in interest rate since policy response to the economy heavily relies on the previous interest
rate. Also, this result is consistent with Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000), in which the empirical
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estimation of lagged interest rate is in between 0.6 and 0.8. In addition, the persistence in the shock
is also supporting the explanation of the inertia in interest rate. (Rudebusch 2002)
Figure 3.1 shows the comparison between actual and fitted value from the model. It is shown
that the model fits the actual data. Therefore we can conclude that the model does a good job in
capturing the movement of each variable including the movements of Federal Fund rate.
Figure 3.1: The model’s fitting to the data
3.5 Estimating the System without the Persistent Shock
According to Rudebusch (2002), persistency in Federal Fund rate would be due to the illusion
caused by serially correlated shock. The implication behind this argument is that it is difficult to
distinguish the gradualism from serially correlated shock when the parameters in policy rules are
freely estimated. In this vein, it would be reasonable to estimate the model without the persistent
shock although lagged interest rate and the persistent shock have important roles in describing the
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inertial movement in the Federal Funds rate. To isolate the effect of the gradualism in this section,
the model will be estimated without the persistence in the error term. If the interest rate inertia is
due to the serial correlation, then f3 (the lagged interest rate term) should be insignificant.
To estimate the model without persistent shock, the quasi-log-likelihood is modified as follows:
lnL(θ,Ψ; {Yt}T1 ) ∝ −
n(T − 5)
2
ln(2pi)− (T − 5)
2
ln|Ψ|+ 1
2
ln(1− ρ2)− 1
2
T∑
t−6
(ω′tΨ
−1ωt) (3.7)
Therefore, concentrated quasi-log-likelihood is
lnLc(θ,Ψ; {Yt}T1 ) ∝ −
n(T − 4)
2
ln(1 + 2pi)− (T − 4)
2
ln|Ψˆ(θ)| (3.8)
As shown in Table 3.2, all parameters have the conventional sign as before, and in term of absolute
value, there is no large difference between this specification and the previous one. In the policy rule,
however, only the coefficient on lagged Federal Funds rate is statistically significant, and supports
the gradualism. However, since the estimation without the persistence shock shows less statistical
significance than the previous one in terms of t-statistic, it would be reasonable to include the
persistent shock in the system. Consistent with this, moreover, the model selection criteria, Akaike
Information Criterion (AIC) (10.29 vs. 10.62) and Schwarz Information Criterion (SIC) (10.68 vs.
10.98), also favor the system with the lagged interest term and the persistent shock. Also, this
result still supports Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000), in which the empirical estimation of lagged
interest rate is in between 0.6 and 0.8.
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Table 3.2: Quasi-FIML Estimation Results without the Persistent Shock
IS Curve Phillips Curve
Parameter Pointe est. SD Parameter Pointe est. SD
a0 27.57362 36.78396 b0 0.508157 0.335335
a1 0.120881 0.137149 b1 0.144982 0.186338
a2 0.881443 0.136109 b2 0.857655 0.059829
a3 -0.310721 1.398703 b3 0.463693 0.204341
b4 -0.482036 0.287319
b5 8.16E-05 4.36E-05
Federal Funds Rate Other Results
Parameter Pointe est. SD Log likelihood AIC SIC
f0 2.795260 1.819854 -527.9929 10.62649 10.98678
f1 -0.062742 0.048932
f2 0.000259 0.000228
f3 0.886011 0.047974
3.6 Estimating the System without the Lagged Interest Rate.
As mentioned above, Rudebusch (2002) showed that the gradualism could be fully explained by the
persistence in the errors, that is, serially correlated errors. As before, to isolate the effect of the
gradualism, the model will be estimate without the lagged interest rate. The quasi-log-likelihood
for the model without the lagged interest rate is:
lnL(θ,Ψ; {Yt}T1 ) ∝ −
n(T − 5)
2
ln(2pi)− (T − 5)
2
ln|Ψ| − 1
2
T∑
t−6
(ζ ′tΨ
−1ζt) (3.9)
Therefore, the concentrated quasi-log-likelihood is
lnLc(θ,Ψ; {Yt}T1 ) ∝ −
n(T − 4)
2
ln(1 + 2pi)− (T − 4)
2
ln|Ψˆ(θ)|+ 1
2
ln(1− ρˆ2) (3.10)
As shown in Table 3.3, the sign of each coefficient is same as before. All coefficients have the
conventional sign. One important conclusion is that the results indicate strong persistence in the
error term. The AR(1) coefficient, ρ is statistically significant and close to 1. Even though this
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is not direct evidence supporting the gradualism in interest rate, it could be the indirect evidence
supporting the inertial movement in interest rate. As mentioned by Rudebusch (2002), therefore,
the gradualism could be the illusion. However, it is not conclusive since the gradualism is one
reason to account for the inertial movement in the interest rate. This is why the gradualism is still
an open question.
Along with this, two main differences between this model and the previous one is (1) the significance
of the interest rate equation is marginally improved and (2) the value of the estimate of f1 and f2
are larger. According to the model selection criteria (AIC and SIC), however, this model is inferior
to the estimation with the lagged interest rate and the persistent shock.
Table 3.3: Quasi-FIML Estimation Results without the Lagged Interest Rate
IS Curve Phillips Curve
Parameter Pointe est. SD Parameter Pointe est. SD
a0 25.78153 38.10551 b0 0.408983 0.366992
a1 0.116297 0.131341 b1 0.126444 0.213963
a2 0.885727 0.130515 b2 0.66476 0.076228
a3 -0.374605 1.417423 b3 0.444290 0.199757
b4 -0.450577 0.292830
b5 7.24E-05 4.28E-05
Federal Funds Rate Other Results
Parameter Pointe est. SD Log likelihood AIC SIC
f0 24.35651 1.2113021 -521.7385 10.97117 10.75543
f1 -0.450522 0.041192
f2 0.001517 0.000203
ρ 0.889934 0.044835
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3.7 Comparison with the Seemingly Unrelated Regression Esti-
mation
In this section, to check the robustness of the estimation in previous sections, A methodology,
Seemingly Unrelated Regression (hereafter SUR), is employed. The results are summarized in
Table 3.4, 3.5, and 3.6. As shown in each table, there is in general no significant difference in
point estimate. The main difference is that the SUR estimation gives a slightly higher statistical
significance in the estimation. In line with the literature, I present here only quasi-FIML estimation
result.
Table 3.4: SUR Estimation Results
IS Curve Phillips Curve
Parameter Pointe est. SD Parameter Pointe est. SD
a0 27.76560 19.75486 b0 0.470768 0.225664
a1 0.121863 0.104831 b1 0.085437 0.136387
a2 0.880516 0.103520 b2 0.867258 0.057833
a3 -0.301343 0.873369 b3 0.495302 0.189806
b4 -0.463633 0.228334
b5 8.20E-05 2.99E-05
Federal Funds Rate
Parameter Pointe est. SD
f0 4.852812 1.083383
f1 -0.097559 0.026723
f2 0.000365 0.000115
f3 0.791994 0.033155
ρ 0.556929 0.090633
3.8 Business Cycle Sensitivity in the Policy
”My topic today is the challenges confronting monetary policy in what has been an unusually weak
recovery from a severe recession. I will discuss the Federal Reserve’s ongoing efforts in these
circumstances to speed the U.S. economy’s return to maximum employment in a context of price
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Table 3.5: SUR Estimation Results without the Persistent Shock
IS Curve Phillips Curve
Parameter Pointe est. SD Parameter Pointe est. SD
a0 27.59177 19.75790 b0 0.503880 0.225437
a1 0.116088 0.104923 b1 0.136957 0.135712
a2 0.886192 0.103610 b2 0.858637 0.057484
a3 -0.312082 0.873473 b3 0.470017 0.188628
b4 -0.481333 0.227019
b5 8.18E-05 2.99E-05
Federal Funds Rate
Parameter Pointe est. SD
f0 2.793516 1.221417
f1 -0.062733 0.030866
f2 0.000259 0.000134
f3 0.886151 0.034870
stability.” Yellen, Janet, March 4th, 2013 Speech.
One of the most important objectives in the Federal Reserve System is the unemployment
rate. Of course, some central banks have different priorities in their policy. However, stabilizing
the economy is the main purpose of the central bank. Unemployment is, in this point of views,
at least implicitly an important ingredient in their deicison-making. Even if it would not be
possible to include unemployment as important economic indicator in the decision-making ex-
plicitly, it implicitly one which affects the decision-making. For example, if unemployment rate
is high, central bank tries to stimulate the economy with the policy instruments such as interest
rates. Therefore it could be possible to test how the observation of the economic indicators
like unemployment can have an effect on the policy decision-making. To check this, the data is
divided into 2 sub-samples on the basis of unemployment rate. The criterion for the sub-samples
is average 6 percent unemployment rate from 1982Q1 to 2007Q3. If the unemployment rate is
higher than this, it can be seen as recession, vice versa. Note that the number of observation
in each sub-sample below and above 6 percent is 61 and 41, respectively. As shown below in
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Table 3.6: SUR Estimation Results without the Lagged Interest Rate
IS Curve Phillips Curve
Parameter Pointe est. SD Parameter Pointe est. SD
a0 27.51447 19.75714 b0 0.492541 0.225582
a1 0.114017 0.104928 b1 0.119585 0.136181
a2 0.888220 0.103615 b2 0.855748 0.057725
a3 -0.317131 0.873450 b3 0.487580 0.189448
b4 -0.478624 0.227939
b5 8.21E-05 2.99E-05
Federal Funds Rate
Parameter Pointe est. SD
f0 24.38402 0.882758
f1 -0.451261 0.027163
f2 0.001520 0.000126
ρ 0.889688 0.036903
Table 3.7 and 3.8, the policy responses to the economy is stronger when the economy is below 6
percent, vice versa. In other words, the magnitude of each coefficients under below 6 percent have
the larger value than the situation under above 6. This implies that the Fed would be concerned
about the employment, that is, the Fed are less responsive when unemployment is high while the
Fed are more responsive when unemployment is low. In addition to this, the parameters for the
inertia are different to each situation. Under below 6 percent, the parameters have about the
same magnitude in each coefficient while it does not under above 6 percent. From this, it can
be inferred that the Fed implements the more discretionary policy when there is unemployment
above the average while the Fed follows the consistent policy rule when unemployment rate is
below. Therefore even if the policy rule does not include some economic indicators, it would be
reasonable to think that the Fed considers other indicators when the policy is made. In this point of
view, how the Fed observes the economic situation is very important gradient in the decision-making.
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Figure 3.2: Movement of Unemployment Rates
Table 3.7: Quasi-FIML Estimation Results with the Sub-Sample above 6 Percent
IS Curve Phillips Curve
Parameter Pointe est. SD Parameter Pointe est. SD
a0 0.137344 5958.432 b0 2.581506 53.11101
a1 0.522840 10.75509 b1 0.213039 23.93276
a2 0.504287 10.58668 b2 0.278487 4.255887
a3 -2.273485 260.8166 b3 0.187469 11.05993
b4 0.205622 23.60499
b5 0.000895 0.014178
Federal Funds Rate Other Results
Parameter Pointe est. SD Log likelihood AIC SIC
f0 3.618587 14.46107 -399.5720 21.89993 21.48967
f1 0.127016 0.769729
f2 -0.001477 0.005837
f3 0.532377 0.542595
ρ 0.000000 0.002381
3.9 Conclusion: Empirical Approach
In this chapter, empirical results shows that both the gradualism and persistent shock are important
to describe the movement of Federal Funds rate. Especially, the interest inertia is more likely to
support the gradualism rather than serially correlated errors, in terms of value of coefficient and
statistical significance. However, even though the partial adjustment has a more important role in
describing the dynamics of the interest rate, we cannot exclude serially correlated errors as did in
Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000). As the model in Chapter 2 shows the inertial movement in the
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Table 3.8: Quasi-FIML Estimation Results with the Sub-Sample below 6 Percent
IS Curve Phillips Curve
Parameter Pointe est. SD Parameter Pointe est. SD
a0 4.153715 596.2877 b0 0.007584 3.601677
a1 0.474805 0.533542 b1 0.034595 0.880160
a2 0.494153 0.548099 b2 0.961391 0.315323
a3 -5.929060 9.810490 b3 0.077869 0.727999
b4 -0.057070 1.051381
b5 -0.000115 0.000517
Federal Funds Rate Other Results
Parameter Pointe est. SD Log likelihood AIC SIC
f0 6.439978 2.741108 -439.3123 15.667333 15.34855
f1 -0.156692 0.071049
f2 0.000624 0.000340
f3 0.896412 0.059302
ρ 0.277125 0.111548
interest rate is due to the timeliness of the data defined as the discrepancy between real-time data
and revised data. Our empirical result shows that the interest inertia is caused by both the partial
adjustment and serially correlated errors. We can, therefore, conclude that the interest rate inertia
is due to the timeliness of the data. In this point of view, this paper suggests another theoretical
reason why the interest rate moves gradually.
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